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Introduction 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG 
During recent decades tuition for undergraduate students has risen at 
rates substantially higher than the rate of inflation at both public and 
private colleges and universities in the United States.1 These high rates 
of tuition increases led Congress to establish the National Commission 
on the Costs of Higher Education in 1997 to conduct a comprehensive 
review of college costs and prices and to make recommendations on 
how to hold tuition increases down. Parents of college students, tax-
payers, and government officials all wanted to know why academic insti-
tutions can't behave more like businesses—cut their costs, increase their 
efficiency, and thus keep their tuition rates under control. 
Part of the answer to this question, and the subject of Governing Acad-
emia, is how higher education institutions are governed in the United 
States. In some states, coordinating boards oversee both public and 
private higher educational institutions and help to rationalize course 
and degree offerings across institutions. In other states, their focus is 
solely on how public higher education is organized and administered. 
Public higher education is often organized into a system, or several 
systems, of academic institutions, with governing boards elected or 
appointed for each system or for individual institutions. For example, 
in New York State, there are two public systems, the State University 
of New York (SUNY) and the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Each of these multicampus systems has a single board of trustees that, 
among other things, appoints the president of each campus, approves 
program offerings at each campus, and sets tuition for the entire system. 
In contrast, in Florida the governor and legislature recendy approved 
a change in how their system of public academic institutions is gov-
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erned, eliminating the single statewide board of trustees for the whole 
public university system and establishing boards for the individual cam-
puses.2 Private higher educational institutions always have boards of 
trustees. 
The size and composition of boards, along with whether the trustees 
are appointed or elected, differ across institutions in both the public 
and the private sector. For example, the governor of Florida appoints 
all of the board members for that state's public universities, but all of 
the board members for the University of Michigan are elected in bien-
nial statewide elections. At Princeton University, a leading private aca-
demic institution, alumni elect some of the board members, the board 
itself elects some members, and the governor of New Jersey appoints a 
member. 
Boards of trustees have fiduciary responsibility for all that goes on at 
an academic institution. However, typically they delegate most of their 
authority to the institution's president and become involved only in 
major policy decisions. The president in turn appoints a team that 
includes central administrators, as well as deans of individual colleges 
within multicollege institutions. These administrators then oversee 
the institution in conjunction with a system of faculty governance that 
specifies the sharing of decision-making power between faculty 
members and administrators. Increasingly, other staff and students are 
also involved in decision making. 
Faculty members play a key role in the governance of academic 
institutions. They are the creators of new knowledge and, along with 
students, the key participants in the educational process. Hence, on 
educational matters the faculty often reigns supreme. Such matters 
include admission standards, curriculum, graduation requirements, 
faculty hiring and promotion processes, and the like. While trustees for-
mally retain the final authority on academic matters, in practice they 
rarely overturn administrative recommendations. Administrative rec-
ommendations, in turn, are heavily influenced by faculty decisions. 
This system of shared governance between trustees, administrators, 
and faculty members has often led to the perception that no one is really 
in charge of academic institutions. An often-repeated phrase is that an 
administrator trying to lead the faculty faces the same problem as a 
person trying to "herd cats." Other observers have described academic 
institutions as "organized anarchies" (Cohen and March 1986). As a 
result, it should not be a surprise that changes in academia come only 
slowly and that it is difficult to get institutions to focus on economic 
efficiency and holding down costs. 
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The governance of academic institutions also relates to how they are 
organized and how revenues flow and costs are allocated across the 
institutions. Some universities, for example, place the sciences, social 
sciences, and humanities within a single college of liberal arts and sci-
ences. Others have separate colleges for each of the three disciplinary 
groups. The different forms of organization may well influence the 
decisions that are made within a university. So too may the systems used 
to allocate revenues and costs. Some institutions treat the whole insti-
tution as a single budgetary unit, while others treat each unit as a "tub 
on its own bottom" and hold each unit responsible for balancing its own 
budget. 
Because of the Supreme Court decision in the Yeshiva case, very few 
private colleges and universities have faculty unions.3 However, many 
faculty members at many public institutions are covered by collective 
bargaining agreements, as are many other employees in both public and 
private universities. The last few years have also seen a dramatic growth 
in the number of campuses at which graduate teaching assistants have 
won the right to bargain collectively over their working conditions. 
Higher education is subject to a set of governmental regulations and 
the requirements of what might be called "nonlegal legal influences" 
on academic governance and the decisions at universities. Government 
regulations include environmental, nondiscrimination, and immigra-
tion rules—the most recent of the latter to hit academia is the USA 
PATRIOT Act, which was enacted as an outgrowth of 9/11 and will 
increase the costs and decrease the ability of American academic insti-
tutions to enroll foreign students. Nonlegal legal influences include 
intellectual property issues, the role of donors in determining policy, 
insurance carriers' requirements, accreditation bodies, higher education 
academic consortia and athletic conferences, and sole-source service 
providers. Each can have a substantial effect on the cost structure of an 
academic institution and on the efficiency of its operations. 
Finally, higher education in the United States has traditionally con-
sisted of a nonprofit private sector and a public sector. However, the 
last decade has seen the growth of accredited for-profit higher educa-
tion institutions—one notable example is the University of Phoenix, 
which is now the largest (in terms of enrolled students) private higher 
education institution in the United States. The growing competition 
from the for-profit institutions, whose governance structure is often 
more corporate in nature, is putting pressure on the nonprofit and 
public higher education institutions to meet the competition, and this 
in turn may affect how they are governed. 
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The chapters in this volume cover all the aspects of higher education 
governance just discussed. The focus of each is on what social scientists 
know about that aspect of governance and on the types of future 
research that might be undertaken to help us better understand how to 
improve the performance of these institutions. 
The chapters in part i deal with state governance of higher educa-
tion and boards of trustees. The section begins with an essay, "Presi-
dents and Trustees," by James O. Freedman, a former president of 
major academic institutions, both public and private, who now serves 
on the boards of several other institutions and whose experiences 
uniquely qualify him to write on this topic. His essay addresses the dif-
ferences in roles that the boards of public and private institutions play 
and the interactions of an academic institution's president with the 
board in each of these types of institutions. His experiences lead him 
to suggest how boards can improve their functioning and how a presi-
dent and his or her board can maximize their joint effectiveness in 
guiding their institution. 
Benjamin Hermalin has a long-standing interest in the functioning 
of boards of directors of corporations and nonprofit institutions and 
how boards influence the performance of these organizations. In 
"Higher Education Boards of Trustees," Hermalin points out how an 
understanding of for-profit corporate boards may provide insights into 
how academic boards of trustees operate, and indicates crucial differ-
ences between corporations and academic institutions that make it 
unlikely that all of the findings with respect to corporate boards will 
carry over to academic boards. 
Donald Heller's chapter, "State Oversight of Academia," first dis-
cusses the history of state governance of higher education and what the 
social outcomes of our higher education system are likely to be. He then 
asks whether how states choose to administer higher education has any 
impact on the end results. 
Part 2 focuses on how the organization of a university and the 
allocation of revenue and costs across units can affect outcomes at the 
institution. 
In "Darwinian Medicine for the University," Susanne Lohmann treats 
the university as an institution whose organization has evolved over a long 
history to help solve problems of information and commitment. She 
stresses that aspects of the university that may appear to outside observers 
to be defects, such as the tenure system and impermeable departmental 
boundaries, are actually subtle design solutions that have evolved to help 
facilitate the university's goals. Thus any proposal to reform university 
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governance needs to be crafted very carefully, with a full understanding of 
the institution's local history and environment. While institutional gov-
ernance rules tend to get etched in stone, it is important to judge carefully 
whether they are defects of the system that need to be changed or defenses 
of the system that help it to achieve its goals. 
Thomas Hammond's "Herding Cats in University Hierarchies" pres-
ents a "bottom-up" perspective of how the formal structure of univer-
sities can affect the outcomes from their decision processes. Using 
simple illustrations that deal with the way an institution might group 
four different departments into two colleges, he shows how the method 
of grouping will bring different types of information, different packages 
of advice, and different sets of conflict to the attention of top-level 
administrators. Thus the optimal way to structure a university depends 
on the types of information, advice, and conflicts that the administra-
tor considers most important. 
John D. Wilson's "Tiebout Competition versus Political Competition 
on a University Campus" compares centralized budgeting models with 
decentralized budgeting models that treat each unit as a "tub on its own 
bottom." Under a broad set of circumstances, he shows that the decen-
tralized budgeting models, which often are more formally referred to 
as "responsibility center management," or RCM models, yield less effi-
cient outcomes than the more centralized ones. In particular, he argues 
that the centralized budgeting models provide better incentives to 
increase educational quality. Given the movement of many universities 
toward RCM models, his essay is an important one. 
Part 3 concerns shared governance and collective bargaining in aci-
demia. Over thirty years ago, the American Association of University 
Professors conducted the last major survey of academic institutions that 
ascertained the extent to which faculty and administrators shared gov-
ernance in a variety of decision-making areas. In "How Academic Ships 
Actually Navigate," Gabriel Kaplan reports the results from a new 
survey of governance at academic institutions that he undertook at the 
turn of the twenty-first century. Despite concern by faculty nationwide 
that their role in governance has diminished over time, Kaplan finds 
that faculty play a significant role in governance at many institutions 
and that their authority is greatest in their areas of expertise—curricu-
lum, degree requirements, and hiring and promotion. In contrast, 
administrators and boards have more authority in budget making, long-
run strategy, and facility issues. 
"Collective Bargaining in American Higher Education" is a product 
of the work of three Cornell undergraduate students, Daniel Klaff, 
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Adam Kezsbom, and Matthew Nagowski, and myself. After reviewing 
what social scientists know about the effects of faculty unions, we 
present the results of the first study of the impact of collective bar-
gaining on staff salaries in higher education and discuss the emerging 
phenomenon of graduate student unions. Using data for a set of public 
research universities provided to us by a data exchange consortium, we 
investigate the effects of graduate student unions on graduate assistants' 
salaries, hours of work, and other economic outcomes. The competi-
tion to attract first-class graduate students to major research universi-
ties appears to have more effect on these outcomes than does collective 
bargaining per se. 
The chapters in part 4 deal with the external forces that affect gov-
ernance and how academic institutions behave. In "Nonprofit and For-
Profit Governance in Higher Education," Brian Pusser and Sarah 
Turner address the growing importance of the for-profit sector in 
higher education, the differences in governance between the for-profit 
and nonprofit sectors, and how the growing importance of the for-profit 
sector will likely influence governance in the nonprofit sectors. They 
caution that one impact of the growth of the for-profit sector is that 
nonprofit and public higher education institutions may be forced to 
behave more like the for-profits, which in turn will reduce the ration-
ale for public subsidies, either directly in the form of state appropria-
tions or indirectly in the form of tax exemptions. 
Michael Olivas, in "The Rise of Nonlegal Legal Influences on Higher 
Education," provides four case studies of nonlegal factors that influence 
higher education governance in the sense that they dictate policy 
responses and constitute the complex features of statutory, litigative, or 
regulatory requirements. The four cases Olivas addresses are the roles 
of insurance carriers, accreditation, consortia, and sole-source 
providers. He shows how pervasive the influences of these nonlegal 
legal influences are on academic institutions' behavior. 
In the conclusion, I summarize the major themes in this volume and 
look to the future. I discuss the trends in the environment—including 
growth in enrollments at a time when many state governments are 
limiting their financial support for public higher education institutions; 
the increasing use by many academic institutions of part-time faculty, 
non-tenure-track full-time faculty, and adjunct faculty; and the growth 
of collective bargaining for graduate assistants and adjunct faculty on 
higher education campuses—that will likely influence higher education 
governance in the years ahead. 
